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The inﬂuence of relative wealth on fairness considerations is analyzed in a
series of ultimatum game experiments in which proposers and receivers are given
large and widely unequal initial endowments. Subjects initially demonstrate a
concern for fairness. With time however, the dynamics of behavior become at
odds with both subgame perfection and fairness. Evidence of learning is detected
for both proposers and receivers in the estimation of a structural reinforcement
learning model. The estimation results suggest that, guided by foregone best re-
sponses and an acquired sense of deservingness, rich subjects become more selﬁsh,
while poor subjects, inﬂuenced only by their past plays and outcomes, learn to
tolerate this behavior.
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During the last two decades, experimental economics has clearly demonstrated that
agents do not maximize only their monetary payoﬀs.1 In particular, players in ultimatum
games are willing to sacriﬁce their own payoﬀs and often refuse “free money”.2 Such
behavior is widely believed to be motivated by equity or fairness concerns.3 Experimental
studies have also established that behavior in ultimatum games may be aﬀected by
learning, as well as cultural, social, psychological and/or environmental factors. The
present paper is an attempt to analyze the inﬂuence of one such factor. Namely, a
series of ultimatum games experiments is conducted to try to determine whether fairness
considerations, and in particular their stability over time, are aﬀected by observed wealth
diﬀerences between subjects.
The analysis of observed wealth diﬀerences in ultimatum games, although challeng-
ing, is important as it may help us better understand the nature of fair behavior. In
particular, it oﬀers the possibility to test the robustness of recently proposed fairness
models compared to the more traditional game theoretic approach constructed around
self-interested agents. In addition, the inﬂuence of relative wealth on fairness considera-
tions may have important, and not yet well determined, real life consequences. Indeed,
traditional ultimatum games do not explicitly account for wealth diﬀerences that typ-
ically exist between participants in most real life bargaining situations such as wage
negotiations, international trade between developed and less developed countries, or
pre-trial settlements between (e.g.) a patient and a hospital in a malpractice case. The
analysis of wealth diﬀerences as one of the determinants of bargaining outcomes and
fairness perception, is therefore of academic and practical interests.
The ultimatum game corresponds to the last round of a two player bargaining process,
in which a proposer oﬀers an ultimatum in the form of a share of a given pie. This
1See also Andreoni et al. (2001) or Bewley (1998) for ﬁeld evidence.
2See Camerer and Thaler (1995), Roth (1995) or Güth (1995) for surveys of the ultimatum game
literature.
3The term fairness is used here broadly, and it encompasses several theories such as reciprocity,
inequality aversion, or altruism.
2oﬀer can be either accepted or rejected by a receiver. If the oﬀer is accepted, then an
agreement is reached and the pie is shared according to the oﬀer. If the oﬀer is rejected,
then the bargaining process stops and players receive no payoﬀ. If players are assumed
to maximize their own monetary payoﬀ, then subgame perfection predicts that proposers
oﬀer the smallest possible positive portion of the pie and receivers always accept. In
sharp contrast with this theoretic prediction, the following facts have been consistently
observed in ultimatum experiments, independent of the experimental design: most oﬀers
lay between 40% and 50% of the pie; there are almost no oﬀers above 50% and below
15%; the probability of rejection decreases with the oﬀer; and oﬀers below 20% are rarely
accepted.
These experimental results were originally perceived as anomalies since it is tradi-
tionally assumed that the Homo economicus is self-interested (see Camerer and Thaler
1995). In the wake of mounting experimental evidence, some models incorporating static
fairness considerations have been recently developed.4 These models are able to organize
a large part of experimental data. However, they do not account for social, psycholog-
ical, and learning eﬀe c t st h a th a v eb es h o w nt oi n ﬂuence behavior in the ultimatum
game. For instance, anonymity (Hoﬀman et al. 1994), chivalry (Eckel and Grossman
2001), and deservingness or morally justiﬁable entitlement (Hoﬀman et al. 1994, Eckel
and Grossman 1996, Ruﬄe1 9 9 8 )h a v eb es h o w nt oa ﬀect behavior, either toward or
away from the subgame perfect equilibrium. In addition, we shall see in section 2 that
evidence of learning has been detected in ultimatum game experiments, suggesting that
fairness considerations may not be stable over time.
A previously unexplored psychological factor that may aﬀect the outcomes in ul-
timatum games is the observed wealth diﬀerence between players. Indeed, one may
expect subjects to act more fairly when it is known that they are wealthier. Alterna-
tively, wealth may also provide some bargaining power that will be used to extract more
favorable and possibly more inequitable outcomes. The present paper proposes an exper-
4See e.g. Rabin (1993), Levine (1998), Fehr and Schimdt (1999), or Bolton and Ockenfels (2000).
3iment in an attempt to test these hypotheses, and to verify whether fairness preferences
are stable over time in the presence of wealth inequalities. As we shall see however,
the analysis of relative wealth in experimental economics is non-trivial and presents a
number of challenges. The experiment proposed to address these challenges consists in
three treatments. Treatment 0 is similar in nature to the traditional ultimatum exper-
iments. In treatment 1 (respectively 2) proposers (respectively receivers) are initially
endowed with a large amount of money. Then, they play the same ultimatum game
as in treatment 0. The allocation of the endowments by the experimenter is common
knowledge and purely arbitrary. It is therefore diﬃcult to justify it morally. In addition,
the endowment is substantial enough that it can be assumed to create adequately wealth
diﬀerences between participants.
In a nutshell, the results are as follows: Subjects initially attempt to reach an egali-
tarian division of their overall earnings (i.e. the initial endowment plus the revenue from
the ultimatum game); with experience, however, rich (poor) proposers make smaller
(larger) oﬀers, while rich (poor) receivers are more likely to reject (accept) small oﬀers.5
In other words, the dynamics of behavior not only contrast with previous ultimatum
game experiments, but they are also at odds with both subgame perfection, and the no-
tion that fairness preferences at stable over time. To explain the dynamics of behavior,
a structural reinforcement learning model accounting for experience and foregone best
responses is estimated. The estimation results suggest that both proposers and receivers
learn to adjust their strategies. This result is remarkable since evidence of learning on
the part of receivers has rarely been collected in traditional ultimatum games. The esti-
mation results also suggest that the evolution of strategies may be essentially explained
by a combination of four factors: ﬁrst, rich subjects acquire most bargaining power as
their opponents lose their ability to punish greedy behavior; second, the rich players’
learning process is mainly driven by foregone best responses rather than the actual pay-
oﬀ received; third, unlike their opponents, the monetary expectations of rich subjects
5To simplify, subjects (not) receiving the large initial endowment will be labelled as “rich” (“poor”).
4increase with time; fourth, poor players select their strategies based on their past payoﬀs
and actions. In other words, the dynamics of behavior in the experiment was aﬀected by
wealth diﬀerences, as rich subjects appeared to become more selﬁsh, while poor players
learned to tolerate their opponents increasingly aggressive behavior.
The paper is organized as follows: the related literature is summarized in section
2; the design of the experiment is presented in section 3, and discussed in section 4;
the experimental outcomes are analyzed in section 5; the general reinforcement model is
brieﬂy explained in section 6; the estimation results are commented in section 7; ﬁnally,
section 8 concludes.
2. Related Literature
To the best of our knowledge, the eﬀect of observed wealth diﬀerences on the behavior
of subjects in bargaining experiments has never been explicitly analyzed. Equal initial
endowments, however, are often implicitly provided to experimental subjects in the form
of a participation fees.6 Such fees usually vary between $3 and $10, which may represent
up to 100% of the pie to be divided in the bargaining game. No signiﬁcant treatment
eﬀect has been observed in bargaining experiments when participation fees are equally
provided to both parties. In other words, these experiments suggest that behavior in
ultimatum games is not aﬀected by traditional absolute wealth eﬀects. It may be argued,
however, that the participation fees may have been too modest to represent adequately
wealth. Although the object of the present paper is to concentrate on observed wealth
diﬀerences, it has to be acknowledged that the question of absolute wealth eﬀects has
not been fully resolved.
Wealth diﬀerences between participants have rarely been introduced in bargaining
experiments. Güth et al. (1992) tried to induce behavior conforming to subgame perfec-
tion by providing receivers in ultimatum experiments with modest initial endowments.
6See e.g. Ochs and Roth (1989), Roth et al. (1991), Ruﬄe (1998), Duﬀy and Feltovich (1999), or
Cooper et al. (2003).
5The data suggested that initial endowments appeared to lower slightly oﬀers, but no sig-
niﬁcant support was provided in favor of either fairness or subgame perfection. However,
the authors concluded that the experimental outcomes may be explained by the combina-
tion of two factors: ﬁrst, the roles of proposers and receivers were auctioned prior to the
ultimatum game, and second, subjects only played one round. In the present paper, po-
sitions are randomly attributed and the experiment consists of 60 periods which provides
ample opportunity to learn. Goeree and Holt (2000) use small asymmetric endowments
in a two stage bargaining model to diﬀerentiate fair from random behavior. They ﬁnd a
prevalence of fair proposals that tend to equalize the overall earnings. Subjects, however,
were not given the opportunity to learn. Finally, Eckel and Grossman (1996) analyze a
dictator game where proposers face “needy” and/or “deserving” responders such as the
American Red Cross.7 The authors ﬁnd that altruism is more common than usual, but
non-negligible greedy behaviors are still observed. Unlike Eckel and Grossman (1996),
the diﬀerences in wealth, and the needs of participants are diﬃcult to justify morally in
the present study.
The ﬁrst wave of bargaining experiments yielded conﬂicting results regarding the
importance of learning in ultimatum games. Indeed, Binmore et al. (1985) found an
eﬀect of experience, while Güth and Tietz (1988), as well as Neelin et al. (1988), did
not ﬁnd any evidence of learning. More recent studies however, clearly indicate that
proposers learn to lower slightly their oﬀers (e.g. Slonim and Roth 1998). On the
other hand, with the notable exception of Cooper et al. (2003), very little evidence of
learning on the part of receivers has been collected. Erev and Roth (1998) argue that
this stylized fact is consistent with the prediction of a choice reinforcement learning
model, since accepting or rejecting small oﬀers provide basically the same amount of
reinforcement. As we shall see in section 5.1, this observation may also be partially
explained by the fact that the receivers’ strategies are typically imperfectly observed in
traditional ultimatum experiments.
7The dictator “game” is similar to the ultimatum game except that the receiver has no alternative
but to accept the proposal.
63. The Experimental Design
We present in this section the diﬀerent experimental treatments. The main diﬀerences
with traditional ultimatum experiments are then discussed in a subsequent section.
The experiment was conducted with volunteers at the State University of New York
at Stony Brook. There were three experimental sessions, one for each treatment and each
with 60 subjects and 60 rounds. No subject participated in more than one session. Prior
to any session, the pool of 60 subjects was equally divided in two groups of proposers and
receivers. To preserve anonymity, each group was asked by E-mail to meet in a diﬀerent
laboratory located in separated buildings. A small number of additional subjects were
also invited in each group in order to anticipate any potential withdrawal. At the
beginning of the session, players were assigned to an isolated computer and informed of
their role as receivers or proposers. Subjects remained in the same role for the entire
session. Subjects were told in advance how many rounds would be played, and they
knew that the experiment would not exceed 2 hours. Instructions were then read aloud,
followed by participants’ questions, and two dry runs in which the outcome did not count
toward the players’ ﬁnal earnings.8 The analysis of the data begin with the ﬁrst round
involving cash payoﬀs. At the beginning of each round, players were randomly matched
in pairs. To avoid reputation building, the subjects were informed that the assignment
was such that it was not possible to identify the other member of the pair, and no pair
was identical in two successive rounds.9
The design of treatment 0 is a hybrid between the ultimatum game in strategic and
extensive forms. As further discussed below, this design enables the experimenter to
observe fully the receiver’s strategy, while preserving subgame perfection as a relevant
equilibrium concept. In each round, each proposer and receiver participated in a two
stage game. In stage 1, the proposer makes an oﬀer in cents between 0 and $50 while
8The complete list of instructions are available at this web address:
http://www.sunysb.edu/economics/research/workpap.html.
9During the course of the experiment, each proposer was matched twice with each receiver. However,
the one-shot nature of the game was essentially preserved since the probability of playing against a given
player in a given period was negligible.
7the receiver simultaneously announces a minimum acceptable oﬀer (hereafter MAO)
corresponding to the smallest oﬀer he is willing to accept. At the beginning of stage 2, the
proposer’s oﬀer is revealed to the receiver. The receiver is then given the opportunity to
revise his strategy by accepting (rejecting) an oﬀer below (above) the MAO he announced
in stage 1. To promote truthful announcements in stage 1, the revision is only randomly
approved by the computer with probability 0.5. In other words, a receiver could reject
(accept) in stage 2 an oﬀer he originally declared he would accept (reject), but the
revision had only a ﬁfty percent chance of being implemented.
The money is allocated exactly according to the proposer’s oﬀer under two scenarios.
In the ﬁrst scenario, the oﬀer exceeds the MAO and either no revision takes place in
stage 2, or a revision to reject the oﬀer is not approved. In the second scenario, a revision
to accept the oﬀer is approved. As we shall see, to ensure that the hybrid and traditional
ultimatum games have the same (subgame) perfect equilibrium, we have to impose that,
although considered accepted, an oﬀer exactly equals to the MAO yields only half of the
oﬀer to the receiver, while the proposer receives his entire share of the proposed division
(i.e. $50 minus his oﬀer). In such cases, the receiver could still revise his strategy by
rejecting the oﬀer in stage 2, in order to try to deprive both players of their payoﬀs.10
Finally, in all situations not previously mentioned, neither players receives any money
for this round.
After choices are made, both members of the pair are informed of each others ac-
tions (oﬀer, MAO and possible revision) and payoﬀs. In addition, the computer screen
displayed the subject’s own history of plays for the last ﬁve rounds. At the end of the
session a round and six pairs of subjects who were matched during that round were
drawn randomly. Each selected player was paid in cash the amount of money earned
during the selected round. In addition, every subjects received $5 just to participate.
The experimental design was slightly modiﬁed in treatments 1 and 2. The object
of these treatments is to analyze the eﬀect of known wealth diﬀerences between pro-
10Given the wide range of oﬀers and MAOs available to subjects, a situation in which the proposer’s
oﬀer equal the receiver’s MAO never arose in the subsequent experiments.
8posers and receivers. This implies that, prior to the ultimatum game, both players
should have positive but unequal levels of wealth. Therefore, the experimental design
remained identical to treatment 0, except that widely unequal endowments were now
allocated at the beginning of each round. Namely, proposers (receivers) received $50
in treatment 1 (2) while receivers (proposers) were given only $10.11 The distribution
of initial endowments, as well as the rules of the game were common knowledge. The
payment method was identical to treatment 0, except that the selected players received
their initial endowments for the randomly chosen round in addition to their earnings
from the ultimatum game. In addition, every subject received $5 just to participate.
Note also that rich players (if selected) received a more than adequate remuneration
f o rt h e i rp a r t i c i p a t i o ni nt h ee x p e r i m e n t ,e v e nw h e nt h eu l t i m a t u mg a m er e s u l t e di na
disagreement. The diﬀerence in initial endowments is therefore assumed to represent
adequately wealth inequality between players.
Each session lasted approximately an hour and a half. Although no time limit was
imposed on subjects, the length of a round (roughly a minute) was constant within
and across sessions, suggesting that subjects exercised the same amount of introspection
at the beginning and the end of each experiment. On average, the selected proposers
(receivers) earned $20.53 ($17.21) in treatment 0, $78.33 ($21.4) in treatment 1 and
$24.7 ($72.5) in treatment 2.12
4. Comments on the Experimental Design
The design of an ultimatum game experiment to analyze relative wealth eﬀects and
learning presents a number of challenges. We now discuss some of the solutions proposed
to address these challenges.
The ﬁrst challenge consists in artiﬁcially creating in a laboratory wealth diﬀerences
between subjects. The solution adopted is to provide half of the subjects with an initial
11The initial endowment should not be confused with an outside option which is allocated only after
a negotiation breakdown (e.g. Binmore et al. 1989 or Kahn and Murnigham 1993).
12These amounts include the initial endowments and the ultimatum game outcomes.
9endowment suﬃciently large to represent adequately wealth inequality. However, the
potential proﬁts of rich players in the ultimatum game must remain commensurate to
their initial endowment, in order to promote rational-like behavior, and avoid the so
called “satiety eﬀect” (see Friedman and Sunder 1994). Moreover, a pilot experiment
indicated that providing poor subjects with no initial endowment was perceived as to
unfair, which led a substantial number of poor subjects to either refuse to participate in
the experiment, or to act in an apparently random manner.13 It was therefore decided
to conduct the experiment with i) unequal but strictly positive endowments for both
types of subjects, and ii) a large amount of money to be divided in the ultimatum game.
The second challenge is to design an experiment that may be ﬁnanced with a rea-
sonable research budget. Indeed, it would be extremely costly to provide every subjects
with suﬃciently large initial endowments to create artiﬁcially wealth diﬀerences. To ad-
dress this problem, a random payment approach was adopted, in which only 1 out of 5
subjects received a payment associated with his performance.14 This payment method,
however, diﬀers from most ultimatum games where subjects are either paid their cumu-
lative payoﬀs during the entire session (e.g. Bolton and Zwick 1995 or Abbink et al.
2001b), or one round is drawn at random and every subject receives the payoﬀ he earned
for this speciﬁc round (e.g. Ochs and Roth 1989 or Slonim and Roth 1998). Although
the payment mechanisms have not been found to generate a signiﬁcant treatment eﬀect
in ultimatum games, one may still wonder whether the random payment method may
aﬀect how subjects behave in the experiment.15 Indeed, a potential drawback of this
method is that subjects may become unmotivated realizing that their decision in each
13This pilot experiment already provides some information on the eﬀect of observed wealth inequality
on behavior in the ultimatum game. However, one should be prudent not to extrapolate unreasonably
from this result, as it may be argued that providing poor subjects with no endowment, while their
opponents receive $50, is a too extreme treatment.
14An alternative approach, adopted for some costly experiments, consists in conducting the exper-
iment in a country with lower standard of living (see e.g. Slonim and Roth 1998). This approach,
however, raises the question of potential cultural eﬀects.
15Starmer and Sugden (1991), as well as Cubitt et al. (1998) ﬁnd no treatment eﬀect when a randomly
selected period is used to pay subjects. See also Camerer and Hogarth (1999) for an analysis of the
eﬀects of incentives on experimental outcomes.
10period has in fact little bearing, in expectation, on their ﬁnal earnings. Although this
issue has not been fully resolved in experimental economics, Bolle (1990), Straub and
Murnighan (1995), as well as Murnighan and Saxon (1998) found no treatment eﬀect in
ultimatum game experiments when adopting a random payment method similar to the
one used here.16 Likewise, we shall see in the next section, that the outcomes observed in
treatment 0 are consistent with previous ultimatum game experiments. Note also that
subjects were allowed to leave the experiment with the show-up fee of $5 immediately
after they were informed of the payment method, or at any point during the experiment.
Only two subjects out of 182 decided to do so before the experiment started. Finally,
a post-experiment survey, and the statistical analysis of the data in the subsequent sec-
tion, did not provide any evidence of boredom, lack of motivation, or random behavior
on the part of subjects.
The third challenge consists in ﬁn d i n gap r o p e rb a l a n c eb e t w e e nc o n d u c t i n gas u ﬃ-
cient number of periods per subject to analyze adequately learning, and preserving the
one shot nature of the ultimatum game. To avoid reputation building stemming from
rematching the same subjects together, it has been decided to conduct a single session
per treatment, consisting of a large number of periods, and including all the subjects
recruited for that treatment. The number of rounds played in the present experiment
may appear large by traditional standards, but it is not unprecedented (see e.g. Winter
and Zamir 1997, Duﬀy and Feltovich 1999, Cooper et al. 2003). Likewise, it is infre-
quent but not uncommon to group all subjects in a single session (see e.g. Ochs and
Roth 1989 or Bolton and Zwick 1995 for examples in the ultimatum game literature).
However, multiple sessions per treatment are preferred in general, as it may be argued
that the behavior of subjects interacting within the same session cannot be assumed to
be fully independent. Indeed, with a small pool of symmetric players frequently matched
together, the actions of a participant may have a lasting eﬀect on the behavior of the
16Bolle (1990) actually argues that paying experimental subjects large amounts of money with low
probability is preferable to paying them small amounts with certainty. Moreover, other recent appli-
cations of a similar random payment method include Franck and Schulze (2000), and Fershtman et al.
(2000).
11other subjects, after they are paired with him, and then with each other. However, the
risk of propagation is lower in the present context, as the number of subjects is large,
and the same participants are rarely matched with each other. Note also that the play-
ers facing each other in the ultimatum game (i.e. the proposers and receivers) are not
symmetric. Therefore, the contamination of the proposer’s (respectively receiver’s) pop-
ulation is more diﬃcult in this context, as it can only be carried out indirectly (e.g. from
a proposer, to a receiver, back to a proposer). As we shall see, this intuition is conﬁrmed
by an econometric analysis which provides no evidence of a systematic dependency in
the data collected in each treatment.
The fourth challenge consists in designing an experiment producing data that enables
to analyze adequately learning. The overwhelming majority of ultimatum experiments
have been conducted under the extensive form of the game, in which the receivers observe
the oﬀer before making a decision. A drawback of this approach is that it creates a data
imbalance since, unlike the proposer strategy, the receiver’s actions are not observed for
all possible oﬀers but only for the actual oﬀer made by the proposer. This data restric-
t i o nm a k e si td i ﬃcult to analyze properly the dynamics of the strategies for each type of
players, and it prevents in particular the estimation of structural models such as adjust-
ments or learning models. The implementation of the strategic form of the game enables
one to correct the data imbalance. Indeed, both players’ strategies are fully observed by
the experimenter, as oﬀers and MAOs are stated simultaneously. However, the timing
of the ultimatum game is modiﬁed from a two stage game to a one-shot simultaneous
move game. As a consequence, subgame perfection is lost as a solution concept. In ad-
dition, Roth (1995) argues that the strategy method may generate diﬀerent behaviors,
as receivers may regret their choice when they observe the actual proposer’s oﬀer. In
fact, a recent comprehensive study of thirty two published papers on ultimatum games,
indicates that the strategic implementation does not aﬀect the actions of proposers, but
it inﬂuences how responders behave (see Oosterbeck et al. 2001). This study therefore
reinforces the need to use the hybrid design, as it appears to oﬀer the advantages of both
the strategic and extensive approaches, without some of the obvious drawbacks. Indeed,
12both players strategies should be fully observable, since subjects have a strict incentive
to make truthful announcements in stage 1. In particular, the receivers must reveal his
strategy in stage 1 in order to avoid the potential cost associated with the revision lottery
in stage 2. However, receivers also have an incentive to correct any mistake or regret
in stage 2.17 In addition, subgame perfection remains a relevant equilibrium concept in
this two stage game. Indeed, if subjects are self interested, then receivers have a strictly
dominant strategy consisting in announcing a MAO strictly smaller than the oﬀer. In
addition, an oﬀer equal to the MAO is strictly dominant for proposers. Therefore, the
(subgame) perfect equilibrium consists for proposers to oﬀer the smallest possible share
of the pie in stage 1, and for receivers to always accept this oﬀer by setting a MAO of
zero in stage 1, and by accepting any strictly positive oﬀer in stage 2.18 In other words,
the hybrid model has the same (subgame) perfect equilibrium, and the same equilibrium
payoﬀsa st h eu l t i m a t u mg a m e .
5. Experimental Results
The experimental results are summarized in Graphs 0.1 to 2.6 and Tables 1 to 4.19
For the analysis to be consistent with previous studies (in which the pie is often $10)
oﬀers and MAOs have been divided by 5. Therefore, the players’ strategies may also be
interpreted as deciles of the total pie.
[Table 1 Here]
Before describing the experimental outcomes, we conduct a statistical analysis of the
data collected in each treatment to verify whether i) conducting a unique session per
17As we shall see in section 5.1, however, receivers appear to reveal their true preferences in stage 1,
since they rarely exercised their right to revise their strategy in stage 2.
18Ap r o p o s e rm a yn o tw a n tt ot a k et h er i s ko fm a k i n ga$ 0o ﬀer, since it may be rejected in stage 2
by the receiver who is indiﬀerent in this situation between accepting and rejecting the oﬀer.
19Graphs 0.1 to 0.6 are associated with treatment 0. Graphs 1.1 to 1.6 (2.1 to 2.6) are associated
with treatment 1 (2).
13treatment generated a signiﬁcant correlation between subjects’ actions; ii) the random
payment method, and/or the large initial endowments led some subjects to behave in a
random manner. To capture potential systemic eﬀects across individuals, the regressions
conducted in this section will rely on a random-eﬀect speciﬁcation. This reduced-form
approach, enables to exploit the panel structure of the data to account for possible
correlations between the strategies selected by a subject across time.
The strategy st
i selected by subject i in period t is modelled as a function of the
































are the strategies in the two previous periods of subject j,w h e r es u b j e c tj was the
opponent of subject i in period t − 1; s
t−2
j is the strategy in period t − 2 of subject j ,
where subject j  was the opponent of subject i in period t − 2; s
t−2
i is the strategy in
period t−2 of subject i , where subject i  was the opponent of subject j in period t−2;
νi is the individual random-eﬀect parameter; and ﬁnally, εit is an error term. In other
words, the econometric model accounts for all the strategies in the history tree of player
i, backing up two periods. Note in particular that subject i and i  are of the same type
(i.e. both proposers, or both receivers). In other words, δ6 signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero will indicate that a subject’s actions contaminate his entire population. Moreover,
{δk =0 , ∀k =1 ,...,6} will indicate that subjects acted randomly, and did not adjust
their strategy over time.
To gain eﬃciency, the model is estimated with the general method of moment ap-
proach developed by Blundel and Bond (1998). Table 1 reports the regressions results
for the sample of proposers and receivers in each treatment.20 For both types of players
in each treatment, the parameters associated with the actions played beyond the previ-
20For the sake of brevity, the parameters associated with the random-eﬀe c ta r en o tr e p o r t e da st h e y
have no economic interpretation. Note, however, that the random-eﬀect term is always signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero at a 5% level, which provides support for the random eﬀect-speciﬁcation adopted.
14ous period, and in particular δ6,a r en o ts i g n i ﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. In other words,
it appears that a subject’s current choice depends only on the previous period actions,
and in particular, it is not directly aﬀected by decisions taken by other subjects in his
own population. To conﬁrm this result, the regression in (5.1) has been estimated after
excluding the previous period actions (i.e. imposing δ1 = δ3 =0 ). The results in Table
1 indicate that in this case, a player’s strategy in period t can only be explained by his
o w na c t i o ni np e r i o dt−2. In other words, we cannot detect any dependency within the
samples of proposers and receivers, and the correlation between proposers and receivers
actions does not appear to extend beyond the previous period.
Moreover, to test for random-like behavior (i.e. δk =0 , ∀k =1 ,...,6) we apply the
extension to the general method of moment framework of the Wald test to each sample
of proposers and receivers in each treatment (see e.g. Newey and West 1987). The
Wald statistics vary between 45.694 and 59.464, which correspond to P-values ranging
from 3.406E-8 to 5.782E-11. In other words, there is no indication that subjects, and
in particular rich proposers in treatment 1 and rich receivers in treatment 2, acted
randomly during the experiment. To verify whether subjects became un-motivated by
the end of the experiment, we test the same hypothesis on the samples collected during
the last ten periods of each treatment. The Wald statistics now vary between 38.852
and 53.264, which correspond to P-values ranging from 6.751E-7 to 1.038E-9. In other
words, subjects did not exhibit any apparent random-like behavior, even by the end
of the experiment. To summarize, we ﬁnd no evidence that the experimental design
created a signiﬁcant dependency in the data, or generated random behavior on the part
of subjects.
5.1. Treatment 0
The sole objective when analyzing the experimental outcomes in treatment 0 is to verify
whether the introduction of the design modiﬁcations outlined in the previous section
created a signiﬁcant treatment eﬀect compared to traditional ultimatum games. Several
approaches may be considered to address this issue. The most thorough approach would
15consist in conducting a control treatment with the traditional ultimatum game design,
and to compare it with alternative treatments in which the design modiﬁcations would
be individually or jointly incorporated. The indispensability of a control treatment may
be questioned, since the main behavioral characteristics of the traditional ultimatum
game have been well established in the multiple experiments conducted over the years.
Moreover, we are in fact only interested in knowing whether the combination of all design
modiﬁcations produced a signiﬁcant eﬀect on behavior. Therefore, we adopted an alter-
native approach consisting in comparing the outcomes in a treatment including all the
design modiﬁcations, with those observed traditionally in ultimatum game experiments.
The experimental outcomes in treatment 0 are summarized in Table 2. Pooling data
over all periods, the average oﬀer is 4.38 while the average MAO is slightly below with a
mean of 3.42 (see Table 2). These actions resulted in an overall rejection rate of 23%.21
There are few oﬀers above 6 (3.94%) and below 2 (2.06%). Graph 0.4 shows that oﬀers
and MAOs slightly decrease over time, but they mostly remain within a narrow interval
(see also the comparison of the ﬁrst and last 10 periods in Table 2). To conﬁrm this
observation, let us run the following random-eﬀect regression separately for each sample
of proposers and responders:22
s
t




j + νi + εit . (5.2)
The regressions results in Table 3 indicate that the time trend parameters in treatment
0 are small, but signiﬁcantly smaller than 0 in both samples. This suggests that both
proposers and receivers slowly adjust their strategies over time by announcing smaller
oﬀers and MAOs. As noted previously, the ﬁnding of adjustments on the part of re-
ceivers is remarkable since it has rarely been detected in ultimatum experiments, even
when subjects participated for a large number of rounds. This result should be essen-
21The overall rejection is rather high, but it is consistent with previous studies (see e.g. Roth et al.
1991, Abbink et al. 2001b, Slembeck 1999).
22This speciﬁcation has been preferred over alternatives on the basis of a test of the over-identifying
restrictions.
16tially credited to the strategic implementation of the ultimatum game, as it allows the
experimenter to observe fully the strategy of receivers.
[Tables 2 and 3 Here]
Graph 0.1 indicates that the MAOs are symmetrically distributed around their mode
located in the range 3-4. The oﬀers have a mode of comparable magnitude in the interval
4-5, but they are essentially concentrated between 2 and 6. The analysis of the ﬁrst and
last 10 periods (Graphs 0.2 and 0.3) conﬁrm the slight decrease of strategies over time.
However, the general shapes of the strategy distributions are essentially preserved.
The evolution of the rejection rate is volatile, and a series of regressions conﬁrms that
it does not exhibit any obvious trend (see Graph 0.5). Graph 0.1 also indicates that the
rate of rejection decreases rapidly with the oﬀer made.23 For instance, oﬀers above 4 have
a 91.2% chance of being accepted, while oﬀers below 2.5 are rejected 85.2% of the time.
Following Slembeck (1999), let us deﬁne a measure of the proposers’ bargaining power as
t h ei n c o m ed i ﬀerence (in percentage of the pie) between proposers and receivers. Graph
0.5 indicates that this measure of the proposers bargaining power is slightly positive,
and remains roughly stable over time.
Finally, receivers revise their strategy in stage 2 of the game only 5.61% of the time.
The curve in Graph 0.6 indicates that most of these revisions (54%) occur within the ﬁrst
1 0p e r i o d so fp l a y s .T h en u m b e ro fr e v i s i o n sa saf u n c t i o no ft h ed i ﬀerence (in dollars)
between the oﬀer and the MAO announced in stage 1 is also plotted in Graph 0.6.24
This bar graph is concentrated around zero, indicating that most receivers revise their
strategy when the proposer’s oﬀer is close to the MAO originally announced. Notice,
23The rejection rate for low and high oﬀers should be interpreted with caution through the paper
because they are often based on few observations.
24This graph should be read as follows: the highest bar indicates that 25 receivers decided to revise
their strategy in order to accept an oﬀer to divide the $50 they initially declined, that was between $0
and $1 smaller than the MAO they originally announced. Note also that unlike the other graphs and
tables, Graphs 0.6, 1.6, and 2.6 have not been constructed with the oﬀers and MAOs divided by 5, but
with the actual dollar values.
17however, that the revisions are not symmetrically distributed around zero. Indeed, the
ﬁve bars to the right, representing the rejections of oﬀers originally accepted, account
only for 1/4 of the total number of revisions. In contrast, 58.4% of the revisions consist
of receivers deciding to accept an oﬀer that was between $0 and $5 smaller than the
MAO announced in stage 1. In other words, after a few periods of practice receivers
learn to make few and only small mistakes in stage 1, and they appear to have very few
regrets in stage 2.25
To conclude, the outcomes appear to be consistent, both qualitatively and quanti-
tatively, with previous ultimatum game experiments. More speciﬁcally, the distribution
of oﬀers, the probability of rejection, the distribution of payoﬀs, and the evolution of
behavior is analogous to what is typically observed in traditional ultimatum games.
In addition, the low rate and the distribution of strategy revisions suggest that, with
experience, the extensive and strategic implementations of the game generate similar
behavior from experimental subjects. In other words, not only the experimental design
modiﬁcations did not change the theoretic predictions, but they also did not appear
to create any signiﬁcant treatment eﬀect compared to the traditional ultimatum game
experiment. Nevertheless, it cannot be excluded that in a diﬀerent context the two de-
s i g n sm a yp r o d u c ed i ﬀerent behaviors. To test whether the modiﬁed design is in general
behaviorally equivalent to the traditional ultimatum game is beyond the scope of the
present paper. What is truly important for the purpose of our study is that we have
established that, like in an ultimatum game, subjects in treatment 0 appear to express
a concern for fairness that is sustained over time.
5.2. Treatment 1: Rich Proposer
T h eo v e r a l la v e r a g eo ﬀer (4.29) and MAO (3.11) are slightly smaller than in treatment
0. These ﬁgures, however, only tell part of the story. Indeed, Table 2 indicates that,
25The tables, graphs, and econometric estimations in this section are based on the MAO announced,
and they do not account for possible strategy revisions by receivers in stage 2. However, given the small
number and the distribution of the revisions, the tables, graphs and econometric estimations diﬀer only
slightly, and the nature of the results presented is preserved when the revisions are taken into account.
18compared to treatment 0, both players strategies are higher (lower) in the ﬁr s t( l a s t )1 0
periods. As illustrated in Graph 1.4, and conﬁrmed by regressions of the form (5.2) (see
Table 3), strategies now sharply decrease during the course of the experiment. MAOs still
have a mode in the usual range 3-4 but they are now much more uniformly distributed
(Graph 1.1). Note that a substantial number of receivers initially make large demands
(i.e. between 4 and 6 in Graph 1.2). By the end of the session however, most receivers
are willing to accept very small oﬀers (i.e. lower than 2 in Graph 1.3). The mode of the
oﬀers is still in the interval 4-5 but larger (smaller) oﬀers are now much more frequent
i nt h ee a r l y( l a t e )p e r i o d so ft h eg a m e( s e eG r a p h s1 . 1t o1 . 3 ) .
The rejection rate is slightly larger than in treatment 0, but it still does not reveal any
speciﬁc trend (Graph 1.5). Graph 1.1 indicates that small oﬀers are much more likely to
b ea c c e p t e dt h a ni nt r e a t m e n t0 .F o ri n s t a n c e ,o ﬀers below 2.5 are now accepted almost
one third of the time. Graph 1.5 also indicates that the bargaining power is initially on
the receiver’s side, but it is increasingly captured by proposers over time. Finally, the
number of revisions made by receivers increases slightly compared to treatment 0, but
its distribution over time and oﬀers remains similar (Graph 1.6).
To conﬁrm the presence of a treatment eﬀect the following regression was conducted








j + δ3Early T0
t
i + δ4Late T0
t
i + νi + εit , (5.3)
where Early T0t
i (respectively Late T0t
i) is a dummy variable equal to 1 for data col-
lected in treatment 0 within the ﬁrst (respectively last) 10 periods. The results pre-
sented in Table 4 indicate that the parameters associated with Early T0t
i (respectively
Late T0t
i)a r es i g n i ﬁcantly smaller (respectively larger) than zero for both proposers and
receivers. In other words, compared to treatment 0, rich proposers (poor receivers) are
initially asking less (more) for themselves, but with time, they end up making larger
(smaller) demands.
195.3. Treatment 2: Rich Receiver
The results in treatment 2 are almost the opposite image of those in treatment 1. Com-
pared to treatment 0, oﬀers and MAOs are initially smaller but they rapidly increase
over time (Table 3 and Graph 2.4). The distribution of oﬀe r si sn o wb i - m o d a l( G r a p h
2.1) with a ﬁr s tm o d ei nt h er a n g eo f3 - 4 ,a n das e c o n dm o d ei nt h er a n g eo f6 - 7 .T h e
ﬁrst (second) mode is the result of low (high) oﬀers in early (late) periods (see Graphs
2.2 and 2.3). Proposers are now willing to make oﬀers above 6 more than one third
o ft h et i m eo v e r a l l ,a n das u r p r i s i n g5 4 %o ft h et i m ed u r i n gt h el a s t1 0p e r i o d s( T a b l e
2). This is a striking diﬀerence with treatment 0, and behavior observed in traditional
ultimatum game experiments. Note that the distribution of oﬀers in the last 10 periods
is also bi-modal with a ﬁrst mode in the interval 6-7, and a smaller mode in the range
3-4. An inspection of individual data reveals that subjects cannot be divided in two sub-
samples of “greedy” and “generous” proposers. Instead, it appears that the same players
alternate between small and larger oﬀers with a clear predominance of large oﬀers. The
distribution of MAOs still has its usual mode in the range 3-4, but receivers become
much more demanding with experience (see Graphs 2.1 to 2.3). As an illustration, the
MAOs of 6 and above increase to 26.1% in the last 10 periods.
The evolution of the rejection rate remains as volatile as in the previous two treat-
ments (Graph 2.5). Graph 2.1, however, indicates that small oﬀers are rejected more
often, while large oﬀers are not always accepted. For instance, oﬀers above 4 are now
only rejected 15.1% of the time. The initial bargaining power of proposers shifts rapidly
in the receivers’ hands, in sharp contrast with traditional ultimatum games experiments
(Graph 2.5). Moreover, the number and the distribution of the revisions made by re-
ceivers are once again comparable to treatment 0. Finally, the results of the regression
(5.3) presented in Table 4 conﬁrm the presence of a treatment eﬀect. Indeed, compared
to treatment 0, the oﬀers and MAOs are signiﬁcantly smaller in the early periods, but
they become substantially larger by the end of the experiment.
205.4. Interpretation of the results
It is usually accepted that subjects behavior when they begin an experiment is pre-
dominantly inﬂuenced with real life experiences with comparable games. In real life
bargaining situations, agents are typically not anonymous, the game is often repeated,
the outcomes are frequently observed by others, and traditional norms as well as con-
ventions apply. It has been demonstrated in several experiments that the combination
of these factors is likely to generate fair or egalitarian outcomes in ultimatum games.
This may therefore explain the wealth egalitarian selection of strategies observed in the
ﬁrst periods of the diﬀerent treatments.
On the other hand, the evolution of behavior is at odds with subgame perfection,
and existing fairness models. Indeed, according to subgame perfection, wealth diﬀerences
should not aﬀect the players’ decision process. In other words, the behavior of partici-
pants should remain the same across the three treatments. This prediction is strongly
rejected by the data, since we have just established that the introduction of large and
unequal initial endowments creates a signiﬁcant treatment eﬀect on the dynamics of
plays. It has to be noted however, that behavior in treatment 1 is leaning toward the
game theoretic prediction. This result is remarkable, as it has been notoriously diﬃcult
to induce subjects in ultimatum game experiments to conform to subgame perfection
(see e.g. Weg and Smith 1993).
The predictions of inequality aversion and altruistic models (see e.g. Fehr and
Schimdt 1999 and Bolton and Ockenfels 2000) depend on how wealth diﬀerences are
perceived by agents. If the arbitrary distribution of initial endowments is not seen as
unfair by subjects, then behavior should remain constant across treatments. Otherwise,
these models predict that the diﬀerences in initial endowments will result in more gen-
erous behaviors on the part of the rich players. More speciﬁcally, rich (poor) proposers
should make larger (smaller) oﬀers, and rich (poor) receivers should (not) be willing
to accept small proposals. Such a wealth egalitarian approach appears to be a good
predictor of initial behavior. Indeed, proposers tend to oﬀer some amounts that would
21equalize, or at least reduce the diﬀerence between both players total earnings. The
distribution of MAOs in the ﬁrst periods of plays suggests that the wealth egalitarian
outcome is also initially expected by the receivers. With time however, the experimental
outcomes in treatments 1 and 2 become at odds with the fairness predictions. Indeed,
rich players ask more for themselves, while poor subjects are willing to accept widely
unequal divisions.
The reciprocity approach (see e.g. Rabin 1993) roughly assumes that agents are
willing to punish hostile behavior, but they are inclined to reward other agents who
intend to reward them. Such predictions are not consistent with the dynamics of behavior
observed in the present experiment. Indeed, poor receivers are unfairly treated after a
limited number of periods, but nevertheless, they accept to lower their demands over
time. In addition, reciprocity suggests that revisions to reject an oﬀer in stage 2 should be
more frequent after the receiver observes an unequal proposal. Such behavior however,
is rarely observed since most revisions consist in accepting an oﬀer initially declined.
In addition, revisions essentially occur at the beginning of the session, when oﬀers are
arguably more equitable.
It has to be noted however that the inequality aversion, altruistic, and reciprocity
models have not been developed to predict how behavior may evolve, since they implicitly
assumed that fairness preferences are stable over time. Therefore, failure to explain the
dynamics of behavior in the experiment should not be seen as a deﬁnitive rejection of
fairness models. Indeed, fairness still appears to play a signiﬁcant role, since oﬀers and
MAOs remain non-negligible, even at the end of each treatment. The present experiment
may therefore only suggest that in certain environments, fairness preferences may be
quite unstable over time, and that existing fairness models may need to be generalized
to account for learning and/or other dynamic aspects. To do so however, one would ﬁrst
need to identify the determinants aﬀecting the stability of fairness considerations. In
the next section, we will estimate a learning model in an attempt to address this issue.
Before closing this section, let us mention a number elements revealed through post-
experiment interviews, that provide an insight into the subjects’ motivations when se-
22lecting their strategy. Several authors have suggested that the outcomes in ultimatum
experiments may be explained by the combination of three factors: a fear of disagreement
on the proposers’ side, an ability for receivers to punish greedy behavior, and a desire
for receivers to prove their “toughness” by rejecting free money. Interviews conducted
after the experiments suggest that these factors may have some explanatory power in
the present context. Indeed, the majority of poor receivers declared that they could not
punish proposers since rejections felt relatively more costly to themselves. Rich receivers,
on the other hand, said that their initial endowments led them to punish proposers by
rejecting free money if their initial demands were not met. Some even added that, al-
though they understood that the next subject they would be matched with would be
diﬀerent, they rejected positive and sometime large amount of money to demonstrate
their determination to the proposer. A large number of rich proposers reported that
they did not fear rejection, since they felt satisﬁed with only the initial endowment even
when the ultimatum game resulted in a disagreement. As a consequence, they were
willing to take some risks by making small oﬀers. On the other hand, poor proposers
felt like they lost their ﬁrst mover advantage and that they could only acquiesce to the
receivers requests.
It is important to note that these interviews do not explain the evolution of strategies
in the experiment. For instance, were poor receivers willing to accept less money, and
proposers reacted accordingly? Or were rich proposers making smaller oﬀers, which
constrained receivers to lower their demands? These questions are addressed in the next
section by estimating a structural learning model.
6. General Reinforcement Learning Model
6.1. Preliminaries
The object of this section is to develop a learning model to estimate how behavior
evolved in the experiment. A potential drawback of this structural approach however,
is that subjects are assumed to behave according to the learning model considered.
23As we shall see, several competing models of learning have been proposed in recent
years. The strategy adopted therefore consists in estimating a comprehensive structural
model, capturing most relevant features of these learning models, in order to identify
the determinants explaining the dynamic of plays in each treatment.
To analyze learning, we must also decide whether to use a model for continuous or
discrete strategies. In the experiment, players had access to 5,000 diﬀerent strategies,
since they could make choices in cents between 0 and $50. Focal point strategies, such
as integers, half dollars and oﬀers ending in $.99, were used more frequently but they
accounted only for 16.8% of subjects overall choices. Within the range of strategies se-
lected most often (roughly between $10 and $35 for proposers, and between $5 and $30
for receivers), proposers (receivers) used 1,456 (1,724) diﬀerent strategies representing
approximately 58% (69%) of the strategies available to them. A discrete model would
require to regroup arbitrarily the 5,000 possible strategies into a limited number of clus-
ters. However, Monte Carlo simulations suggest that such arbitrary discretizations may
erase some of the subtle nuances associated with the smooth evolution of behavior ob-
served during the experiment.26 A continuous model therefore appears more appropriate
to analyze precisely the dynamic of plays.
We adopt the general reinforcement learning approach developed by Armantier (2003).
This model not only explicitly accounts for continuous strategies, but it has also been
shown to capture most relevant aspects of existing learning models. In addition, the
general reinforcement learning model is suﬃciently ﬂexible, yet parsimonious, to be con-
sidered for a structural estimation. We now summarize the main features of the model.
6.2. The model
The general reinforcement learning model combines L diﬀerent observational and ex-
periential reinforcement rules, such as for instance choice reinforcement learning (Bush
26This result is consistent with simulations conducted for diﬀerent games, in which continuous learn-
ing models were found to outperform discrete models to explain the evolution of strategies (see e.g.
Armantier 2003 for an auction example).
24and Mosteller 1955, Erev and Roth 1998), imitation (Vega-Redondo 1997, Schlag 1999),
learning direction theory (Selten and Buchta 1999), or reinforcement of unchosen strate-
gies (Camerer and Ho 1999). At round t,p l a y e ri draws her strategy st
i from a continuous
probability density function gt
i(.) deﬁned over the interval [s,s]=[ 0 ,50].T h es t r a t e g y


























where t is the last period played; R(. | .) denotes the reinforcement rule; s ∈ [s,s];
ml
i,k is the strategy reinforced in rule l by player i at any period k ≤ t based on a
reinforcement factor rl
i,k; ﬁnally, β
l is the vector of parameters of the reinforcement
rule l (l =1 ,...,L).T h ef u n c t i o ng1
i(.), commonly known as the initial propensity, may
reﬂect players introspection or experience from previous games. How subjects select
their initial strategy distribution is a question that has been brieﬂy discussed in section
5.4. In the remainder g1
i(.) is a given distribution, possibly a function of parameters to
be estimated.
The reinforcement rule R(. | .) adopted here is based on a normal probability density
function f(. | µk
i,σk
i (t)) with mean µk
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In this simple model β
l = αl,w h e r e0 < α ≤ αl ≤ α < 1. Note that the negative
reinforcement rule in expression (6.2) is always positive, which guarantees that g
t+1
i (.)
is a density function.
25Heuristically, the purpose of the reinforcement rule R(.) is to add some mass to the
strategy density g
t+1
i (.) around or away from the strategy reinforced, ml
i,k,d e p e n d i n go n
the reinforcement factor rl
i,k.27 For instance, if the reinforcement factor is positive (nega-
tive), then the reinforcement rule has the shape of a (an inverse) normal density function
centered on ml
i,k; as a result, player i is more (less) likely to play strategies around ml
i,k in
the future. As the reinforcement factor rl
i,k increases (decreases), the positive (negative)
reinforcement rule becomes more concentrated, and more mass is added (subtracted)
around ml
i,k. There is no experiential learning when the reinforcement factor is zero,
as the strategy distribution stays unchanged. Finally, σk
i (t) becomes larger as k moves
further away from the current period t, which implies that the reinforcement rule R(.)
becomes ﬂatter and less inﬂuential with time. In other words, the exponent of αl acts
as a discount or forgetting parameter that reduces the inﬂuence of past reinforcements.
To illustrate how this general reinforcement learning model captures diﬀerent forms
of learning, consider the traditional choice reinforcement learning model as presented by
Erev and Roth (1998). Players reinforce every strategy sk
i (∀k ≤ t) they played in the
past based on xk
i the payoﬀ received. In other words, the choice reinforcement learning
rule reinforces at period t each strategy ml
i,k = mCRL
i,k = sk




i for any k ≤ t. Similarly, the general reinforcement learning
model may also nest the reinforcement of foregone best responses. In this case, player i







, based on the proﬁt Πk
BR this best response would have generated.








BR,w h e r eθ
RBR ≥ 0 repre-
sents the relative eﬀect of foregone payoﬀs compared to actual payoﬀs. Other possible
reinforcement rules include (e.g.) imitation of popular or successful behavior, payoﬀ de-
pendent imitation, direction learning, as well as other forms of exogenous adjustments
(see Armantier 2003).
27See Armantier (2003) for a more detailed explanation of the model’s properties.
26Erev and Roth (1998) introduced a benchmark, typically representing a “subjective
expected payoﬀ”, to classify payoﬀs as positive or negative reinforcements. Following







i,w h e r eρt
i is the reference point in




i = γ0 + γ1x
t




i,γ0) ∈ R2, 0 ≤ γj ≤ 1( ∀j =1 ,2),a n dxt
i is the payoﬀ of player i at period t.
7. Estimation of the General Reinforcement Learning Model
7.1. Estimation Procedure
From an econometric perspective learning models have two interesting features. First,
the actions observed during the experiment are neither identically nor independently
distributed, since the strategy distributions are updated individually based on previous
periods plays and outcomes. Second, learning models may converge toward a pure strat-
egy equilibrium, in which case the asymptotic strategy distribution g∞
i (.) is degenerate.
These two characteristics are such that the analysis of learning model estimators is non-
trivial and rarely addressed in the literature, with the notable exception of Cabrales
and Garcia-Fontes (1999) and Armantier (2000). The Maximum Likelihood is a popular
method to estimate learning models with a ﬁnite number of strategies (e.g. Camerer and
Ho 1999, or McKelvey and Palfrey 1995). However, as noted by Stahl (1996) and Ar-
mantier (2000), the application of the Maximum Likelihood to continuous strategies may
be hazardous. Indeed, as behavior converges toward an equilibrium, the strategy distri-
bution becomes more concentrated, and later observations are much more inﬂuential on
the likelihood function. This imbalance may result in a disproportionate contribution of
later observations on the parameter estimate.
To circumvent this convergence problem Armantier (2000) proposes a moment esti-
























where β is the parameter vector to be estimated, and η
p
i,t(β) i st h et h e o r e t i cm o m e n t
of order p =1 ,2 of player i’s strategy distribution at period t.28 Heuristically, the
objective is to reconcile observations with their theoretical moments conditionally on the
history of plays. Unlike the Maximum Likelihood, this method oﬀers the key advantage
of allocating the same weight in the objective function to any observation even when
strategies converge.
The expression (7.1) requires the derivation of the theoretical moments at each period
and for all bidders. The strategy distributions do not have tractable analytical forms,
and the theoretical moments η
p
i,t (β) are replaced with arbitrary precision by Monte Carlo
simulation estimates,   η
p
i,t (β). In other words, the estimation method may be interpreted
as a traditional method of simulated moments.
Nested learning models are typically compared on the basis of likelihood ratio tests
(e.g. Stahl 2000 or Camerer and Ho 1999). As previously mentioned however, this ap-
proach is not well suited here due to the inadequate properties of the likelihood function.
Instead, we will consider traditional Wald tests based on the unconstrained optimiza-
tion of the objective function (7.1). The Wald test possesses the appropriate asymptotic
properties, since the moment estimator is consistent and asymptotically normally dis-
tributed. The covariance matrix involved in the determination of the test statistic is
evaluated with a Bootstrap technique based on the estimated parameter   β.29
To conclude, it is important to note that the structural estimation procedure i) relies
on individual observations, and ii) fully accounts for the interdependency in the data
28Higher moments may be included in the objective function. Monte Carlo simulations, however,
suggest that the ﬁrst two moments are suﬃcient in general to obtain precise estimates.
29The Bootstrap is a statistical technique consisting in repeatedly resampling the original data from
the estimated distribution in order to make inferences from the resamples on parameters such as the
standard deviation of the estimated parameters. For details on the Bootstrap technique see Shao and
Tu (1995).
28under the learning models assumptions.
7.2. Estimation Results
We ﬁrst estimate a benchmark model including the traditional choice reinforcement
learning, the reinforcement of foregone best responses, as well as a dynamic reference
point. Alternative learning and adjustment models will be compared and tested against
this benchmark in the next section.
Before we proceed, let us discuss how foregone best responses are approximated in the
ultimatum game. At the end of each period, the foregone best response of a proposer
consists in the MAO announced by the receiver with whom he was matched. In the
rare cases in which a receiver decides to revise his strategy, the proposer’s foregone
best response is approximated by his own oﬀer. This approximation has no signiﬁcant
consequence on the estimated parameters, since revisions are rare and typically occur
when oﬀers and MAOs are close. If the responders only maximize their own proﬁts,
then they always have a (weakly) dominant strategy consisting in announcing a MAO of
zero. As we shall see later on, the experimental data clearly reject any attraction toward
the subgame perfect equilibrium strategy. Instead, we assume that the foregone best
response of a receiver may be represented by the proposer’s oﬀer, since it is the highest
MAO that would have resulted in an agreement. This assumption appears reasonable
for a group of boundedly rational subjects repeatedly playing the ultimatum game, since
it is the best compromise for receivers between reaching an agreement and showing their
determination.30
The positions of the proposers and receivers are not symmetric in the ultimatum
game, and their learning process may therefore diﬀer. Likewise, it has been shown that
the environment in which a game is played may aﬀect the way subjects learn. Conse-
quently, we ﬁrst estimate a general learning model with a speciﬁc set of parameters for
proposers and receivers in each of the three treatments. The vector of parameters to
30Abbink et al. (2001a) show that receivers often reject positive oﬀers in anonymous ultimatum
games in order to establish a group reputation for being “tough”.











where j ∈ {p,r} repre-
sents the player’s position as proposer or receiver; β
CRL
j = αCRL
j is the parameter of the
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are the parameters of the initial strat-
egy distribution function. Proposers (receivers) are initially considered symmetric, and
strategies in period 1 are assumed to be generated from a normal distribution truncated





j ∈ {p,r}. The histograms of both proposers and
receivers strategies in the ﬁrst period of play tend to support this assumption.
Results of the moment estimation method introduced in section 7.1 are presented in
Table 5. As expected, the ﬁrst moment of the proposers and receivers initial propensity
distributions (which is slightly diﬀerent from µj due to the truncation) are signiﬁcantly
larger (smaller) in treatment 1 (2) than in treatment 0.31 This result conﬁrms that
subjects initially attempt to reach an egalitarian agreement that equalizes ﬁnal wealth.
[Table 5 Here]
Let us examine ﬁrst the parameters associated with the choice reinforcement learning
model. The forgetting parameters   α
CRL
j , j ∈ {p,r}, are close to, but signiﬁcantly
smaller than one in all three treatments. This conﬁrms that both types of players learn
to adjust their strategies in all three treatments as the result of their own past plays and
outcomes. The values of the forgetting parameters also imply that experiential learning
occurs at a slow pace, as past and recent experience have almost the same inﬂuence on
the current strategy selection. The forgetting parameter is, however, signiﬁcantly larger
for receivers than for proposers, and it is also signiﬁcantly larger when subjects are rich.
Therefore, the behavior of proposers and poor subjects can potentially change somewhat
more abruptly as the result of new experiences. The fact that proposers and receivers
31The statistical comparisons in this sectiona r ec o n d u c t e dw i t hW a l dt e s t sa ta5 %s i g n i ﬁcance level.
Given the large numbers of comparisons, only the most relevant test statistics and p-values are reported.
30both appear to learn from their own past plays and outcomes is consistent with previous
studies (see e.g. Slonim and Roth 1998, as well as Cooper et al. 2003).
Let us now turn to the estimation of the parameters associated with the reinforcement








, j ∈ {p,r},i so n l ys i g n i ﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero for rich subjects, and for proposers in treatment 0. In other words, the foregone
best responses act as an attractor when subjects possess some bargaining power provided
by their wealth status and/or their ﬁrst mover advantage. In addition, foregone best
responses have a more immediate impact on the strategy selection of rich proposers, since
the forgetting parameter   α
RBR
p is signiﬁcantly smaller in treatment 1. This result may
be explained by the combination of wealth status and ﬁrst mover advantage. Finally,
the parameter θ
RBR
j is signiﬁcantly larger than 1 for rich subjects. This indicates that
rich players reinforce their foregone best response strategy with even more intensity than
the strategy they actually played. Note that the magnitude of this eﬀect is remarkably
larger than in previous studies such as Camerer and Ho (1999) or Armantier (2003).
This diﬀerence may be partially explained by the additional bargaining power provided
by large initial endowments.
Finally, let us examine the parameters governing the evolution of the reference point.
Except for the receivers in treatment 0, most parameters of the reference points laws
of motion are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. As suggested by (e.g.) Erev and Roth
(1998), this result reﬂects the key role played in the reinforcement learning mechanism
by a reference point, transforming payoﬀs into reinforcement factors. Note that the sums








in all three treatments
are roughly equal to the size of the pie to be divided (i.e. $50). In other words, both
types of players have realistic and matching initial expectations. This indicates also that
rich players do not immediately feel that they deserve most of the pie. As expected,
poor (rich) subjects have signiﬁcantly higher (smaller) initial expectation in treatment
1 (2) than in treatment 0. The parameters   γ1,j and   γ2,j, j ∈ {p,r},i nt r e a t m e n t0
are small, and only signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for the proposers. Therefore, the
reference points, and the players expectations, barely evolve over time in treatment 0.
31In the other two treatments, however, both   γ1,j and   γ2,j, j ∈ {p,r},a r ep o s i t i v ea n d
highly signiﬁcant. Given the proﬁle of payoﬀs observed in these treatments, this implies
that the reference point of a rich (poor) subject rises (declines) rapidly over time, as she
sees her payoﬀs in the successive ultimatum games increase (decrease). In other words,
a feeling of entitlement grows over time within rich subjects, while poor participants
come to the realization that they should expect less.
These estimates provide an insight into the way known wealth diﬀerences aﬀected
the dynamics of behavior in treatments 1 and 2. Indeed, the estimated parameters
suggest that guided by foregone best responses, and an acquired sense of deservingness,
rich subjects increased their demands. In contrast, poor players only appear to react to
their opponents increasingly aggressive behavior by scaling down their demands, since
the strategy selection of poor players was essentially inﬂuenced by their own past plays
and outcomes.
7.3. Alternative Speciﬁcations
The object of this section is to test whether alternative models may better explain
the dynamics of behavior. The diﬀerent hypotheses can be nested within the general
reinforcement model, and comparisons will be conducted on the basis of Wald tests.
Results are presented in Table 6.
We ﬁrst verify whether subjects learn to behave homogeneously from their own ex-
perience and observation. To test for the presence of heterogeneity across proposers
(receivers) within the same treatment we estimate the benchmark model with a diﬀerent
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for j ∈ {p,r}.T h e p-values
in Table 6 indicate that one cannot reject the null hypothesis at the usual signiﬁcance
levels. Therefore, we do not ﬁnd conclusive evidence of heterogeneity across players. In
other words, as mentioned in section 5, it is not obvious that we can diﬀerentiate sub-
jects into two sub-samples of “fair” and “greedy” players. Rich players may alternate
between generous and greedy oﬀers, but they all appear to learn to behave in a more
32selﬁsh manner. This test also illustrates the ability of the general reinforcement learning
model to describe the behavior of each proposer (receiver) in a treatment equally well.
We now test whether proposers (receivers) adjust their strategies according to the
same learning model in all three treatments. Under this hypothesis, the diﬀerence in
the dynamics of plays, would be essentially explained by the speciﬁce v e n t se x p e r i -
enced and observed by subjects in each treatment. The benchmark model is estimated











































Tt is the vector of all parameters common to subjects of type j ∈ {p,r} in
treatment t ∈ {0,1,2}.32 The p-values in Table 6 indicate that one can reject the null
hypothesis at the usual signiﬁcance levels. Therefore, it appears that subjects in each
treatment do not learn according to the same model. In other words, the environment in
which the game was played seem to have shaped the way subjects learned. This result
is consistent with previous studies analyzing the inﬂuence of environmental factors on
learning (see e.g. Slembeck 1998 or Armantier 2003).
Next, we verify whether behavior in each treatment may be explained by a sim-
pler learning model than the combination of learning rules estimated in the benchmark
model. We successively test the following hypotheses for the proposers and receivers
in each treatment: ﬁrst, the data may be explained only by a simple choice reinforce-








); second, the data may be ex-









in the modiﬁed benchmark model in which the reinforcement












values in Table 6 indicate that these three hypotheses are always rejected, except for the
receivers in treatment 0 for which the choice reinforcement learning model cannot be
rejected at a 5% signiﬁcance level. In other words, the behavior of receivers in treatment
32To get the best chance to accept the test, we exclude from the null hypothesis the parameters
associated with the initial propensity and reference point, as they diﬀer signiﬁcantly in each treatment.
330 may be explained solely by a simple choice reinforcement learning model. However, a
proper modelization of the dynamics of plays in all other cases requires the combination
of learning rules included in the benchmark model.
We now verify whether the experimental outcomes may be equally explained by an
exogenous adjustment mechanism. Learning is typically assumed to occur when the
strategy selection of a player at a given period is inﬂuenced by his own or any other
players past actions and/or outcomes. In contrast, the general reinforcement rule can
be modiﬁed to represent a completely exogenous adjustment of strategies. Indeed, if
we impose ml
i,k = λ1ml
i,k−1 + s∞(1 − λ1) and rl
i,k = λ2rl
i,k−1 (where λ1 ∈ [0,1[, λ2 > 1,
s∞ ∈ [s,s], αl = rl
i,0 =1 ), then the strategy reinforced and the reinforcement factor
evolve exogenously, and behavior systematically converges toward a pure strategy equi-
librium s∞. The equilibrium model with errors is a special case of exogenous adjustment
in which s∞ is equal in the present context to the subgame perfect equilibrium strat-
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.
Table 6 indicates that both hypotheses are strongly rejected by the data. In other words,
it appears that i) the adjustment process observed in each treatment is not exogenous;
ii) the subgame perfect equilibrium does not act as an attractor; and iii) the evolution
of strategies may be attributed to learning.
Learning direction theory (Selten and Buchta 1999) oﬀers a potential alternative to
explain the dynamics of behavior observed in each treatment. Indeed, according to this
model, subjects may have simply adjusted their behavior in the direction of strategies
that were, or would have been successful. To illustrate the concept of direction learn-
ing consider a proposer in the ultimatum game and the choice reinforcement learning
model. When an agreement is not reached, the proposer should realize that his oﬀer
was too low; he should also understand that a smaller oﬀer would not have improved his
situation, while larger oﬀer could have generated a better payoﬀ.A sar e s u l t ,i n s t e a do f
symmetrically reinforcing strategies around the strategy played st
i, the proposer should
reinforce negatively strategies below st
i, and reinforce positively strategies above st
i.B y
34doing so, the proposer is more likely to generate a strategy larger than st
i,a n dg e ta
better payoﬀ in the future. The notion of direction learning may also be applied to
foregone best responses, in which case st
i is replaced by the best response BR(st
−i) in
t h ep r e v i o u se x a m p l e .
Following Armantier (2003), we can test these hypotheses after incorporating direc-
tion learning within the foregone best response or choice reinforcement rule, by replacing
µk






















where l ∈ {CRL,RBR}, −1 ≤ ωl
ν ≤ 1, [s,s]=[ 0 ,50], ν =1( ν =2 )when the rein-
forcement factor rl
i,k is positive (negative), and Iωl
v<0 is the indicator function satisfying
Iωl
ν<0 =1when ωl
ν < 0 (otherwise Iωl







any potential direction learning associated with a positive (negative) reinforcement fac-
tor. Indeed, when ωl
ν is positive (respectively negative), µk











and strategies slightly greater (respectively smaller) than ml
i,k
are primarily reinforced. Note that µk





 2 increases. This
implies that when the payoﬀ (or the potential payoﬀ) is large and positive (respectively
negative), the center of the reinforcement rule gets closer to the strategy reinforced, so
that the player is more (respectively less) likely to play again the same strategy in the
future. Finally, ωl
ν =0corresponds to no direction learning, while ωl
ν = ±1 can be
considered full direction learning, since players essentially reinforce either s or s for a
reinforcement factor rl
i,k close to zero. Using this model, we can then test successively













p-values in Table 6 indicate that learning direction does not appear to play a signiﬁcant
role to explain the dynamics of plays observed in each treatment.
The benchmark learning model adopted therefore appears to outperform several al-
ternative candidates. To evaluate further the empirical relevance of the estimates, and
the ﬁt of the model, the following regressions have been conducted for each type of
35subjects in each treatment:
s
t






+ εit , (7.3)
where st
j is the average strategy played during a given treatment by subjects in group





is the average strategy in group j ∈ {p,r} at period t
simulated with the general reinforcement model, and the estimated parameter   βj.33 The
F tests in Table 7 indicates that one cannot reject at a 5% signiﬁcance level the null
hypotheses H0 : {δ0 =0 ,δ1 =1 }. In addition, the R2’s reported in Table 7 illustrate
that the learning model explains almost entirely the variation in the aggregated experi-
mental data. In other words, the average path of strategies simulated with the general
reinforcement learning model ﬁts well the average behavior observed in the experiment.
Moreover, to evaluate individual ﬁt, the following regressions have been estimated
f o re a c hp l a y e ri ne a c ht r e a t m e n t :
s
t






+ εit , (7.4)
where st





is the simulated expected
strategy in period t, conditional on the history of plays observed for player i up to
period t. Table 8 indicates that the F tests for the null hypothesis H0 : {δ0 =0 ,δ1 =1 }
could not be rejected for the wide majority of subjects in each of the three diﬀerent
treatments. In addition, the average R2’s in Table 8 suggest that the benchmark model
explains between 76% and 89% of the variance in the individual subjects decisions during
the experiment. In other words, the general reinforcement learning model, along with the
estimated parameters, replicate fairly well the individual behavior of the wide majority
of subjects.
33In fact, the benchmark model is re-estimated for each type of subjects in each treatment, accounting











in equation 7.4, are based on these new sets of estimated
parameters.
368. Discussion
The present paper was an attempt to analyze the important but challenging issue of
the eﬀect of known wealth diﬀerences on fairness considerations, and in particular on
the stability of fairness preferences over time. To address this issue, an ultimatum game
experiment was conducted by providing proposers and receivers with large and widely
unequal initial endowments. The experimental outcomes indicate that subjects initially
attempt to reach an egalitarian agreement that would equalize ﬁnal wealth. With time,
however, rich (poor) proposers make smaller (larger) oﬀers, while rich (poor) receivers
are willing to reject (accept) larger (smaller) oﬀers. In other words, rich players become
more greedy, and this behavior is tolerated by poor subjects.
The estimation of a general reinforcement learning model accounting for experience
and foregone best responses indicates that i) independently of wealth diﬀerences, there
is a clear evidence of learning by proposers and, which is even more remarkable, by
receivers; ii) the monetary expectations of rich (poor) subjects increase (decrease) with
time; iii) the strategy choices of rich players are mainly inﬂuenced by foregone best
responses; and, iv) poor players essentially learn from their own past plays and outcomes.
In other words, it appears that, guided by foregone best responses and an acquired sense
of deservingness, rich subjects became more selﬁsh, while poor subjects learned from
their personal experience to accept this increasingly aggressive behavior.
We are now in a position to propose an answer to the question raised in the title
of the paper. Indeed, the present study suggests that subjects start by adjusting their
strategies in presence of known wealth inequalities, in a way that initially appears to
leave fairness considerations unaﬀected. With time, however, relative wealth seems to
modify the dynamics of behavior in a direction opposite to the fairness prediction.
These conclusions, however, should be interpreted with caution, and, as is often the
case in experimental economics, the generality of the experimental results presented
would need to be conﬁrmed. Indeed, one cannot exclude that the experimental design
adopted in order to enable the joint analysis of relative wealth and learning, partially
37drove behavior. If it is premature to claim that our conclusions extend to other games,
and in particular to the traditional ultimatum game, we have nevertheless constructed
an experiment in which wealth diﬀerences had a signiﬁcant impact on the stability of
fairness preferences. Additional experiments may need to be conducted within the same,
and/or slightly diﬀerent environments, in order to verify whether our ﬁndings are robust,
or to identify the factor(s) that drove behavior away from the fairness prediction in the
present experiment.
If conﬁrmed, the conclusions reached may be signiﬁcant from a practical perspective.
Indeed, there typically exist known wealth diﬀerences between the negotiating parties
in real life bargaining such as wage negotiations or pre-trial settlements. The present
paper suggests that a proper analysis of these situations may require one to take into
consideration the bargaining power provided by wealth. The outcomes of the experiment
may also partially explain and/or justify the success of class action lawsuits, as well as
the intervention of a third party negotiator such as a mediator or a union representative.
Indeed, this may, among other things, level the diﬀerences in bargaining power between
the negotiating parties.
Finally, the present paper provides an insight into the notion of bargaining power.
Economists typically deﬁne bargaining power by its eﬀect (it allows agents to extract
more favorable outcomes for themselves), and by the psychological or environmental fac-
tors from which it is derived (e.g. gender, entitlement, social status or wealth). However,
the following questions have essentially been left unanswered: why do certain factors cre-
ate bargaining power? How does bargaining power change a player’s perspective of the
game so that she modiﬁes her behavior? The present paper sheds some light on the
second question. Indeed, we have shown that the bargaining power provided by known
wealth diﬀerences results in larger monetary expectations, and that the learning process
of players with bargaining power is essentially driven by foregone best responses rather
than personal experience.
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TABLE 1  
RANDOM-EFFECT REGRESSION 
ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SUBJECTS’ ACTIONS 
TREATMENT 0  TREATMENT 1  TREATMENT 2   
Proposers Receivers Proposers  Receivers Proposers Receivers 

























































































































Numbers in parenthesis refer to asymptotic standard deviations, asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. 





TREATMENT 0  TREATMENT 1  TREATMENT 2   
Offers MAO Rejection  Offers MAO Rejection Offers  MAO Rejection 
Mean  4.38  3.42 0.23 4.29  3.11 0.28 5.11  3.69 0.72 
Std 1.22  1.14 0.42 1.57  1.78 0.45 1.92  2.09 0.45 
Median  4.40    3.50 0.00 4.40  3.30 0.00 4.60  3.20 1.00 




Below  2  2.06%  7.06% . 7.39%  32.06%  . 2.72%  12.83%  . 
Mean  4.56  3.64 0.28 4.87  3.97 0.30 4.29  3.28 0.76 
Std 1.17  1.31 0.45 1.40  1.56 0.46 1.42  1.60 0.43 
Median  4.60  3.70 0.00 4.80  3.90 0.00 4.10  3.10 1.00 





Below  2  0.97%  6.77% . 2.26%  10.32%  . 2.90%  11.61%  . 
Mean  4.12  3.20 0.24 3.63  2.64 0.29 5.85  4.25 0.67 
Std 1.18  1.10 0.43 1.76  1.64 0.46 1.87  2.40 0.47 
Median  4.10  3.30 0.00 3.80  2.20 0.00 6.30  3.60 1.00 





Below  2  4.19%  8.39%  . 17.10%  40.00% .  1.94%  10.97% . 
 
 
TABLE 3  
RANDOM-EFFECT REGRESSION  
INCLUDING A TIME TREND 
TREATMENT 0  TREATMENT 1  TREATMENT 2   
Proposers Receivers Proposers  Receivers Proposers Receivers 
1 δ   -0.013* (0.001)  -0.011* (0.002)  -0.025* (0.004)  -0.031* (0.005)  0.033* (0.006)  0.024* (0.004) 
2 δ   0.054* (0.024)  0.032 (0.029)  0.093* (0.034)  0.023 (0.027)  0.095* (0.036)  0.066* (0.021) 
3 δ   0.026 (0.014)  0.008 (0.020)  0.039* (0.018)  0.027 (0.022)  0.032 (0.018)  0.017 (0.031) 
Numbers in parenthesis refer to asymptotic standard deviations, asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. 







TABLE 4  
RANDOM-EFFECT REGRESSION  
TREATMENT EFFECT 
TREATMENTS 0 AND 1  TREATMENTS 0 AND 2   
Proposers Receivers  Proposers  Receivers 
1 δ   0.452* (0.190)  0.409* (0.152)  0.476* (0.182)  0.462 (0.253) 
2 δ   0.307 (0.271)  0.263 (0.187)  0.371* (0.171)  0.310 (0.228) 
3 δ   -0.392* (0.045)  -0.264* (0.068)  0.414* (0.054)  0.389* (0.077) 
4 δ   0.530* (0.022)  0.332* (0.031)  -1.316* (0.082)  -0.893* (0.065) 
Numbers in parenthesis refer to asymptotic standard deviations, asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. 








TABLE 5  
ESTIMATION OF THE GENERAL REINFORCEMENT LEARNING MODEL 
TREATMENT 0  TREATMENT 1  TREATMENT 2   
Proposers Receivers Proposers  Receivers Proposers Receivers 
CRL
j α   0.806* (0.033)  0.943* (0.008)  0.845* (0.022)  0.911* (0.013)  0.759* (0.027)  0.981* (0.013) 
RBR
j α   0.578* (0.091)  0.344 (0.212)  0.410* (0.126)  0.426 (0.333)  0.527 (0.314)  0.630* (0.151) 
RBR
j θ   0.943* (0.090)  0.387 (0.226)  1.478* (0.037)  0.634 (0.340)  0.531 (0.375)  1.135* (0.058) 
1
j ρ   29.104* (0.778)  25.831 (1.055)  21.287* (0.651)  28.920* (0.704)  35.234* (1.038)  20.34* (0.991) 
j , 0 γ   0.154 (0.098)  0.455 (0.298)  0.106* (0.043)  0.253* (0.112)  0.167 (0.105)  0.212 (0.148) 
j , 1 γ   0.187* (0.073)  0.201 (0.176)  0.254* (0.066)  0.196* (0.060)  0.207* (0.082)  0.314* (0.070) 
j , 2 γ   0.078* (0.030)  0.098 (0.067)  0.162* (0.040)  0.150* (0.059)  0.126* (0.029)  0.183* (0.047) 
j µ   23.732* (1.341)  20.012* (1.776)  28.711* (0.605)  24.394* (1.261)  19.490* (0.743)  15.366* (1.323) 
j σ   9.862* (2.034)  11.308* (1.729)  7.229* (2.404)  9.497* (2.007)  8.554* (1.550)  10.989* (1.908) 











 TABLE 6  
P-VALUES FOR NESTED MODEL COMPARISON 
TREATMENT 0  TREATMENT 1  TREATMENT 2   




2 χ Statistics 

























12.592  1.234E-16 
(87.720) 
4.675E-13 



































































































































REGRESSIONS TO EVALUATE THE AVERAGE FIT OF THE MODEL 
TREATMENT 0  TREATMENT 1  TREATMENT 2   
Proposers Receivers Proposers Receivers Proposers  Receivers 
0 δ   0.034 (0.027)  0.012 (0.019)  -0.007 (0.022)  -0.011 (0.014)  0.016 (0.018)  -0.010 (0.020) 
1 δ   0.987* (0.045)  1.014* (0.032)  0.973* (0.032)  0.995* (0.037)  1.021* (0.041)  0.982* (0.030) 
2 ℜ   0.973 0.986 0.966 0.994  0.981  0.976 
F Statistic for 
{} 1 1 , 0 0 : 0 = = δ δ H   2.924 1.917 3.506 1.305  2.417  2.670 
P-Value for  
F Test  0.093 0.171 0.066 0.258  0.125  0.108 
Numbers in parenthesis refer to standard deviations. * Indicates parameters significant at a 5% level. 
 
 
TABLE 8  
REGRESSIONS TO EVALUATE THE INDIVIDUAL FIT OF THE MODEL  
TREATMENT 0  TREATMENT 1  TREATMENT 2   
Proposers Receivers Proposers Receivers Proposers Receivers
 
5%  70.00% 86.67% 63.33% 90.00% 76.67% 80.00% 
 
% of Subjects for Whom  {} 1 1 , 0 0 : 0 = = δ δ H  
is not Rejected at a Significance Level   
1%  86.67% 93.33% 83.33% 96.67% 90.00% 90.00% 
Average  0.766 0.837 0.753 0.879 0.815 0.822 
Min 0.448 0.613 0.410 0.642 0.545 0.577 
2 ℜ  
in Individual Regressions 
Max 0.926 0.938 0.893 0.924 0.907 0.913 
 Treatment 0




















































Offer Minimum Acceptable Offer Rejection Rate




















































Offer Minimum Acceptable Offer Rejection Rate




















































Offer Minimum Acceptable Offer Rejection Rate





























Offers Minimum Acceptable Offers
Graph 0.5: Evolution of 





















































































Bargaining Power Rejection Rate
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Offer Minimum Acceptable Offer Rejection Rate
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Offer Minimum Acceptable Offer Rejection Rate





























Offers Minimum Acceptable Offers
Graph 1.5: Evolution of 
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Offer Minimum Acceptable Offer Rejection Rate




















































Offer Minimum Acceptable Offer Rejection Rate


















































Offer Minimum Acceptable Offer Rejection Rate





























Offers Minimum Acceptable Offers
Graph 2.5: Evolution of 



























































































Bargaining Power Rejection Rate
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